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DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT, EUR/SE

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TAGS: [ASEC](#) [ECON](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [ETTC](#) [EAID](#) [EFIN](#) [CY](#)
SUBJECT: CYPRIOT CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES

REF: SECSTATE 6461

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) This telegram contains Embassy Nicosia's assessment of critical infrastructure and key resources on Cyprus which, if destroyed, disrupted, or exploited, might have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States. Embassy responses are keyed in Reftel order.

¶2. (SBU) Reftel Paragraphs 7, 8: The Embassy does not believe that the loss of Cyprus-owned physical infrastructure, nor the interruption of key resource exports from the island, would immediately affect the security, national economic security, and/or public health or safety of the United States. A Connecticut-sized Mediterranean island some 5000 miles from the East Coast of the United States, Cyprus simply is too small, too distant, and too lacking in natural resources to affect U.S. interests in that fashion. We are unaware of any direct physical linkages, such as pipelines or undersea telephone cables, between Cyprus and the United States, for example. Similarly, there are no sole or predominantly Cyprus-sourced minerals or chemicals on which U.S. industry is dependent.

¶3. (C) Reftel Para 10: Under the terms of the 1960 independence treaties, Great Britain was allowed to retain two "Sovereign Base Areas" (SBAs) and several isolated sites scattered throughout Cyprus, such as the RAF radar dome on Mt. Olympus, the island's highest point, and various antenna arrays in Ayios Nikolaos, near Famagusta. Via varied formal agreements and informal arrangements, the United States enjoys some access to and benefits from these UK facilities. Unlike the Cyprus-owned infrastructure noted above, the damage or complete loss of SBA-housed facilities would pose a threat to our national security interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

¶4. (C) Reftel Paras 11, 12: Cyprus has engaged in limited study of threats to its own critical infrastructure/key resources. For example, after the July/August 2006 evacuation from Lebanon of over 80,000 foreign nationals through Cyprus, GoC officials established a working group to deal with crisis operations, and the Greek Cypriot National Guard soon will conduct a related crisis simulation. In general, however, most Cypriot decision-makers do not consider the island's infrastructure and resources to be threatened and have placed little emphasis on protecting them. For example, although the island depends heavily on financial services and banking, contacts reveal a near-absence of state-of-the-art data protection facilities and procedures. Similarly, Cyprus's waterworks, especially its desalinization plants, are nearly unguarded and therefore susceptible to sabotage.

15. (SBU) Embassy staff regularly raise these concerns with Cypriot interlocutors and have offered ideas, funding, and training to meet them. Meriting special mention is the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program, responsible for providing, inter alia, radiation monitors and underwater surveillance cameras to Cypriot Ports and Customs officials. Other Mission elements have engaged Cypriot counterparts in hopes of improving their humanitarian relief and crisis response operations.
SCHLICHER